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Shiloh
During the weeks after the capture of Fort 
Donelson, the Union army moved south and con­
centrated at Pittsburg Landing on the Tennessee 
River. The Confederate forces of General Albert 
Sidney Johnston were gathered at Corinth, some 
twenty miles southwest of the Landing. By April 
5 Grant had some 40,000 men at Pittsburg, plus 
about 5,800 more at Crump’s Landing a few miles 
north. The Army of the Ohio, under Major Gen­
eral Don Carlos Buell, with some 18,000 men, 
was marching from Nashville to join Grant.
W hen ready, they proposed to attack Johnston at 
Corinth.
Grant had stationed his men in camps between 
two small streams that emptied into the river 
above and below Pittsburg. Roads and swamps 
crisscrossed the campground, while here and there 
were clearings and a few farmhouses. The rest 
of the land was rolling and wooded more or less 
heavily. Near the center of this four-mile-square 
camp and on the top of a ridge was an old aban­
doned road, sunken from many years of use. 
Farther to the west, in the “front line’ of the 
army, stood a small meeting house called Shiloh 
Church. The sunken road would save the Union
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Army on April 6; the little church would give its 
name to the battle fought there.
Grant s Army of the Tennessee consisted of 
six divisions commanded by Generals William T. 
Sherman, J. A. McClernand, B. M. Prentiss, W .  
H. L. Wallace, S. A. Hurlbut, and Lew Wallace. 
Five were at Pittsburg Landing on April 6, while 
the sixth, under Lew Wallace, was at Crump s 
Landing. Eleven Iowa regiments —  the 2nd, 3rd, 
6th, 7th, 8th, 11th, 12th, 13th, 14th, 15th, and 
16th —  were included in these divisions. Farthest 
from the Landing were the divisions of Sherman 
and Prentiss: back of Sherman was McClernand, 
while back of Prentiss was Hurlbut. Closest to 
the Landing was the camp of W .  H. L. Wallace.
One Iowa regiment, the 6th, was with Sher­
man; the 11th and 13th were with McClernand; 
the 3rd with Hurlbut; and the 2nd, 7th, 8th, 12th, 
and 14th with Wallace. Just landing on the morn­
ing of April 6 was the 15th, while the 16th, still 
at the Landing, had been ordered to join Prentiss.
For a few days before April 6 there had been 
several clashes with Confederate cavalry, and 
some prisoners had been taken on both sides, but 
no real warning had come to G ran t’s officers that 
the whole Confederate army had left Corinth and 
was marching toward Pittsburg Landing. John­
ston had moved his troops, numbering some 
40,000, out of Corinth on April 3; by nightfall on 
April 5, they were ready. Second in command to
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Johnston was P. G. T. Beauregard. The four 
corps of the Confederate Army of the Mississippi 
were commanded by Major Generals Leonidas 
Polk, Braxton Bragg, W .  J. Hardee, and Briga­
dier General J. C. Breckinridge.
Grant was at breakfast at his headquarters at 
Savannah, nine miles north of Pittsburg, on the 
morning of April 6 when he first heard the sound 
of heavy firing from the direction of the Landing. 
Boarding his headquarters boat, the T ig re ss , he 
hurried to the Landing where he found his divi­
sions under attack all along the front line, while 
the reserves were rushing forward. Union pickets, 
scouting before dawn, had run into the entire 
Confederate army, supposedly at Corinth twenty 
miles away.
W o rd  went back at once to Prentiss and to 
Sherman, to McClernand, Wallace, and Hurlbut, 
and in the Union lines the ominous long roll from 
the drummers echoed from camp to camp.
By 7 A.M. Sherman s division was in position, 
but the first blow on his left did not come until 
almost 8 o ’clock. Confederate General P. R. Cle­
burne reported that he first saw the Union army 
in “line of battle’ behind their first encampment. 
So much for the wild stories soon to be circulated 
in the North that some of Sherman’s men were 
taken in their tents, and that the rest fled from 
the front at the first shots. Actually, Cleburne’s 
initial assault on Sherman suffered a “quick and
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bloody repulse/' according to the Confederate 
commander himself.
The 6th I owa, in a brigade commanded by its 
colonel, John A. McDowell, was stationed far to 
the right of Sherman’s line. They watched and 
listened to the roar of battle but were not engaged 
until later. W hen  Sherman s left began to crumble 
and was finally turned at 10 o ’clock, his right was 
ordered to withdraw to avoid being flanked. Only 
in this retreat did the 6th Iowa come under fire, 
and then they suffered the greatest loss of any 
Iowa regiment that day — 52 killed.
The 11th and 13th Iowa (Colonels A. H. Hare 
and M. M. Crocker), with McClernand s first 
brigade, came forward on the run to fill the gap 
between Sherman’s left and Prentiss’ right. Their 
first experience under fire unnerved the men of the 
Iowa regiments, and they retreated in confusion. 
As the battle wore on, however, these retreats be­
came more orderly. The men would hold a posi­
tion as long as possible, then retire to a new point 
of defense. Their muskets became begrimed and 
their faces blackened with cartridge powder; ram­
rods, necessary for firing their guns, were lost. 
Yet they fought on until their ammunition gave 
out.
Hurlbut sent one brigade of his division to sup­
port Sherman’s left, and himself led the other 
two brigades to support Prentiss. W ith  Hurlbut 
was the 3rd Iowa, under Colonel Nelson G. Wil-
Jo
hn
st
on
 
ex
pe
ct
ed
 
to
 
pu
sh
 
ra
pi
dl
y 
w
ith
 
his
 
rig
ht
 
w
in
g 
ar
ou
nd
 
Gr
an
t’s
 
lef
t a
s 
sh
ow
n 
by
 
th
e 
lo
ng
 
bla
ck
 
ar
ro
w
ox
( J t / 1
UJ UJ UJ
o » - h- o
< <  zQ: i r  
U i £ 01 crUJ u. *  5UJ >
o O k o KUJ k UJ Z llJ -r I
u. u. U. UJ U- OZ UJ z o z —
o - 1 o o a
O o o
Th
e 
Ba
ttl
e 
As
 
It 
W
as
 
Ac
tu
all
y 
Fo
u
gh
t
90 THE PALIMPSEST
liams. Taking position on Prentiss’ left, on the 
edge of a peach orchard, Hurlbut set up his line 
at an angle and placed three batteries in support. 
His position was a strong one, and the enemy 
hurled attack after attack at his line, only to suf­
fer repeated reverses.
Prentiss, whose troops had been “pulverized 
by the first attack, had retreated after rallying as 
many of his men as possible, first from his for­
ward position to his line of tents and then into 
his third —  and last —  position. At the top of a 
ridge, near H u r lb u ts  peach orchard, Prentiss 
stumbled on the old abandoned road protected by 
dense woods and underbrush. From this natural 
trench his troops could fire upon the enemy but 
could themselves remain almost untouched. Pren­
tiss had found the “H ornet’s Nest .”
There were no Iowans with Prentiss on the 
morning of April 6, but by the time he had re­
treated to the sunken road, five Iowa regiments 
under W .  H. L. W allace  had come up to rein­
force him: the 2nd, 7th, 8th, 12th, and 14th.
These regiments had been camped farthest from 
the point of attack. Ordered into line at about 
8 o ’clock, they had advanced through ever in­
creasing crowds of soldiers, running from the 
battle, and had arrived at the sunken road at about 
the time, probably, that Prentiss succeeded in es­
tablishing his line there. The Wallace brigade, 
filling the gap between McClernand and Prentiss,
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had found the only fixed point of the Union line.
The last two Iowa regiments to come under fire 
were the 1 5th and 16th, at the Landing that morn­
ing. They received orders almost at once to ad ­
vance to support McClernand, and they went into 
battle on a run. carrying guns they had never even 
fired. In the confusion, they were led too far for­
ward into an open field, where they suffered 
heavy losses before being pulled back to the shel­
ter of McClernand s line. In those hours, when 
the men of the 15th and 16th first saw the gray 
coats” and heard the “unearthly rebel yell,’ when 
they saw their comrades and officers falling, hys­
teria gripped them. Retreating in confusion, with 
all semblance of company or regimental organiza­
tion gone, they were reassembled by Major W i l ­
liam W .  Belknap of the 15th. who took command 
when both the colonels, Hugh T. Reid and Alex­
ander Chambers, were wounded.
By 2 o ’clock in the afternoon the Union line 
was shorter but still intact. Albert Sidney John­
ston was then with his troops on their right, urg­
ing them on to attack the Union left where Hurl- 
but stood stubbornly in his peach orchard. Lead­
ing his troops in a charge, Johnston was killed, 
even as Hurlbut’s line began to crumble. The 
Confederate command now shifted to Beauregard.
W ith  Hurlbut’s retreat, Wallace and Prentiss 
were left alone in the abandoned road which the 
Confederates would name the Hornet’s Nest.
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Had it not been for the troops in this one sector, 
the Union army would indeed have been defeated. 
Earlier in the day Grant had visited Prentiss and 
had told him to hold his position “at all hazards.” 
This Prentiss proposed to do. Colonel James M. 
Tuttle of the 2nd Iowa managed to get two of the 
Iowa regiments, the 2nd and 7th, out of the trap 
that was fast closing around them, but the 8th, 
12th, and 14th Iowa, along with the 58th Illinois, 
were caught with Prentiss. General Wallace fell, 
mortally wounded, in the retreat, the highest rank­
ing Union officer to die at Shiloh.
The Union line was now broken everywhere 
except in the center. Prentiss, with some 2,200 
men, was in the middle of a closing ring of Con­
federates. But he still held out, determined “to 
harass [the enemy] and retard his progress so 
long as might be possible. At last, about 5:30, 
realizing that if he did not surrender, his men 
would all be killed, Prentiss mounted a tree stump 
and waved a white handkerchief. His stubborn­
ness had bought another hour and a half for 
Grant at the Landing. The men with Prentiss, 
exhausted as they were, gave up reluctantly, some 
even trying to continue firing, others breaking up 
their guns by smashing them against trees. They 
felt that their long defense of the line had failed: 
not for many years would they realize what they 
had done that dav. But the Confederates knew.J
Albert Sidney Johnston s son later wrote of Pren­
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tiss, Hurlbut, and Wallace: ’These generals have 
received scant justice for their stubborn defense. 
The delay in the Confederate attack which these 
three caused, “was the salvation of Grant s army. ’ 
By the time Prentiss surrendered, it was too late 
in the day for Beauregard to complete the rout 
by attacking Grant at the Landing.
Grant had made good use of the time Prentiss 
gave him. By dusk his remaining troops were 
gathered on the bluff at the Landing, his guns in 
position. At last General Lew Wallace, who had 
been lost all day, trying to find the battle, arrived 
with 5,000 men. And across the Tennessee the 
first troops of Buell’s Army of the Ohio appeared, 
boarding the steamers which ferried them over the 
river. During the night rain fell heavily, the men 
huddled in what shelter they could find, steam­
boats kept up a steady traffic, bringing reinforce­
ments, and two gunboats shelled the Confederate 
camps. W ith  dawn, Grant and Buell were ready.
Now it was the Confederates' turn to be sur­
prised. Reduced to about 20,000, from their orig­
inal 40,000, and with no hope of reinforcement, 
they fought bravely and stubbornly, giving ground 
slowly, and sometimes even mounting counter­
attacks. Finally, at 2:30 in the afternoon they be­
gan a careful retreat from the field that had been 
theirs on Sunday.
The Iowa troops did not see much action on 
Monday. Having been through the worst of the
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fighting on Sunday, having lost three of their regi­
ments, and with many of their officers dead or 
wounded, most of them were held in the reserve 
during the second day’s battle. The 2nd Iowa 
made a bayonet charge on the enemy; the 7th 
captured a Confederate battery; and the 13th 
fought for a time with Buell. The other Iowa 
regiments did no active fighting.
As the weary Confederate troops retreated, the 
Union men sought their old camps. Some 3,500 
men of both armies lay dead on the battlefield, 
and many more would die from wounds received 
during the battle.
The Iowa casualties at Shiloh were more than 
one-third of the nearly 7,000 Iowans engaged: 
235 killed, 999 wounded, and 1,147 missing or 
captured, for a total of 2,381. In addition to those 
killed in the battle, 116 of the wounded died 
within days or weeks as a result of their wounds. 
Iowa, at first cheered by the victory, was stunned 
as the casualty lists grew. The war had now be­
come a reality.
The battlefield of Shiloh is today a national 
military park of about 3,700 acres, ten acres of 
which is a national cemetery where 3,650 men are 
buried, two-thirds of them unidentified. Both 
Union and Confederate markers dot the field, in­
dicating the locations of the various regiments.
Iowa’s state monument and her eleven regi-
% .
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mental monuments were dedicated in November, 
1906, by a group of Iowans, many of them vet­
erans of the battle, led by Governor Albert B. 
Cummins. The  state monument is a granite shaft 
topped with a bronze globe and eagle, while at 
the base a figure of Fame inscribes a tribute 
to the Iowa men who fought and died at Shiloh.
The Iowa Monument 
At Shiloh National Military Park
